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the individual finds his place when he discovers his individuality; the self and others are only two sides or aspects of the same reality; the relation between the individual and society, thus, is dynamic and not static, spiritual and not spatial (pp. 65 ff.). Society is neither a collection of units nor an organism; it is precisely that whole which lives in each of its members and of which each of its members is potentially the whole (chapter X). Progress, likewise, comes through the group process (chapter XIII). "Progress is not determined by economic conditions, by physical conditions, nor by biological factors only, but more especially by our capacity for genuine coöperation" (p. 93). Individuality, society, social progress—all are expressions of the group process, they get their content from it; it is the mainspring of the present, the hope of the future. It points the direction of the World State: "The world will be re-generated by the people who . . . heroically seek, by whatever hardship, by whatever toil, the methods by which people *can* agree" (p. 359). It is the divine within the human: "Man and God are correlates of that mighty movement which is Humanity self-creating. . . . We, by sharing in the life-process which binds all together in an active, working unity are all the time sharing in the making of the Universe. . . . This is the True Democracy" (pp. 103-104).

There is much in this discussion which is interesting and suggestive. If I am not mistaken, the author has touched upon a vital point in the group process. Certainly it is true that, unless people can agree, not by renouncing differences but despite differences and through them, unless it is possible for individuals to make themselves part of an integrated whole of which each can feel himself to be in some sense a real part, then the future of our social evolution would seem to hold little hope for progress. This book does well to call our attention to this basic fact. It does well, also, to suggest that agreement through differences is perhaps after all the fundamental characteristic of conscious life. This is not proved by the present discussion; the author can hardly be said to have dug to the roots of the problem. But the thesis is one which, to the mind of the reviewer, is in line with the current tendency of philosophical thought.

The book is interestingly written, and some of the analyses are penetrating. The author's suggestions concerning the methods for the conscious application of the group process to political and social problems are quite suggestive; to what extent they are practical is a question which cannot here be discussed. On the whole, the book interests the reader from the beginning, stimulates thought always, and not infrequently compels agreement.

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The Interference of Will-Impulses. By ABRAHAM A. ROBACK. Princeton, N. J., Psychological Monographs, Whole No. 111, 1918.—pp. viii, 158.

Psychologists have found it no easy task to bring the higher and more subtle mental processes under experimental investigation, and, while there has been an increasing interest of late years in such inquiry, the work so far done must be considered tentative and preliminary. Dr. Roback's monograph on "The Interference of Will Impulses" is an experimental contribution toward the investigation of that most perplexing of psychical processes, volition. In view of the present state of our scientific approach toward the study of will, Dr. Roback's attempt must, of course, be evaluated with respect to its possibilities for further employment and development in the analysis of volitional impulses.

"The Psychological impulse," says the author, "should include all tendencies to action which are accompanied by consciousness and should form the unit of volition, whether that tendency be more like an impulsion and thus fought against by the individual, or whether it follows a process of careful deliberation" (p. 6). The volitional situation is defined in terms of conflict between these impulse units. "In the most general terms, an impulse is an idea that obtained its promotion at the expense of its congeners, *i. e.*, it could only become an impulse after and because all the other elements in consciousness have been inhibited" (p. 4). Inhibition, therefore, Dr. Roback thinks, is a factor of foremost psychological importance in the volitional situation, and the study of the willing process must be made with special attention to the manner in which conflicting impulses inhibit one another.

In order to bring the warfare of impulses under observation, Dr. Roback designed a modified reaction experiment of a kind calculated to produce inhibitions and conflicts, recorded and analyzed his results most carefully, and called for introspective reports from his subjects. The experiments were conducted in the Harvard laboratories during the years 1913–14 and 1914–15, some 31 subjects in all taking part in the investigation at various times.

The results are summed up in several chapters, detailing the "Objective Results," "Specific Results," "Introspective Results," and "Individual Differences." A chapter on "Applications" is added for good measure. The objective results are in no wise startling. "The outstanding feature of the results," says the author, "both in the simple movement and the graphic experiments is the *universal tendency to move along the lines of least resistance*" (p. 37). This tendency is called the "primary or dominant determining tendency." Employing this tendency as a principle of explanation, Dr. Roback says: "there are scarcely any phenomena which could not be brought in line with, if not actually explained by, the course of least exertion" (p.39).

It is not possible, in brief space, to give any account of the "Specific Results," which are intelligible only in the light of a detailed examination of the experiment. The "Introspective Results" are a disappointment. This might be expected, in view of the fact that no detailed instructions were given to subjects in advance of the experiments (p. 30). They did not know what to fix attention upon. Consequently the introspective reports published in the monograph are vague, heterogeneous, and aimed at nothing in particular. The questions asked by Dr. Roback after the event may have had a system and an aim, but the evidence shows confusion of mind and failure of observation on the part of his subjects. What might have been, in the reviewer's opinion, the most important part of the experiment, was rendered useless by this neglect of instructions. The chapter on "Individual Differences" shows no striking results. Some of the subjects were slow, some fast; some became confused but persisted, some omitted reactions; some "equalized," some "undulated." Various personal peculiarities were noted. Although the tabulated results may some day be valuable in the study of individual differences, they reveal no general principles of differentiation as they stand. The chapter on "Applications" may be passed over in silence. Concerning it the reviewer can only express the opinion that a sense of humor is quite as desirable, in some connections, as the logical faculty itself.

It may be said of Dr. Roback's experiment that it was a faithfully executed piece of work, which deserves close study by anybody interested in the subject under investigation. Turning now, however, to the general plan and design of the experiment, and its possibilities in the field of volition, the reviewer feels impelled to make a few remarks of a 'metaphysical' character. Any student who is reasonably familiar with modern discussions of the will must recognize that Dr. Roback's treatment of volition is mechanistic throughout. In view of the contributions of functionalism toward a teleological interpretation of conscious behavior, the mechanical standpoint ought not to be adopted without some explanation and defence. The particular error which is most conspicuous in this experiment lies in Dr. Roback's implicit assumption that the two reactions to stimuli which he is examining are separate and discrete, each a little volitional 'unit' unto itself. Speaking of the very type of reaction experiment here employed, Professor Bode says: "If the subject is to respond with the right hand to one stimulus and with the left hand to the other, both hands are in a state of activity before the stimulus appears. . . . The various successive movements, then, which make up our temporary reflex achieve their relationship to one another from the fact that they are started simultaneously, and this peculiarity constitutes a distinctive feature" ("Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 233). That is to say, both movements are willed in advance of stimulation, and willed, not separately, but as elements in a total coördination of nervous tendencies. Dr. Roback has left out of account the two most important facts about voluntary action: on the mental side, its purposive character, and, on the physiological side, the prearranged organization of nervous tendencies which it effects. It is only by overlooking all that is characteristic of will that Dr. Roback is able to remain at the mechanical standpoint which views volition as a conflict between impulses of varying energy.

It is the reviewer's opinion that Dr. Roback's experiment was just what it appears to be to the reader at first sight—a reaction experiment. Nothing more.

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